🌐 Global internet freedom
Internet Censorship Observatory
A reference guide to internet censorship around the world: which countries restrict access, what they block, and the methods they use: compiled from public reporting.
Censorship by country
Levels reflect public reporting from Freedom House, OONI, and Censored Planet.
| Country | Level | What is blocked | Method |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🇨🇳 China | Extreme | Google, YouTube, Facebook, WhatsApp, Wikipedia, Twitter | Great Firewall: traffic inspection, DNS blocking |
| 🇷🇺 Russia | High | Instagram, LinkedIn, many Western news sites | SORM infrastructure, Roskomnadzor blocking |
| 🇮🇷 Iran | High | YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Telegram (periodic) | National Internet Network (NIN) filtering |
| 🇰🇵 North Korea | Extreme | Virtually all foreign internet access blocked | Kwangmyong intranet only |
| 🇹🇷 Turkey | Medium | Wikipedia (blocked 2017–2020), various news sites | BTK regulatory authority blocking |
| 🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia | Medium | VoIP services, some political/social content | CITC regulates and blocks |
| 🇦🇪 UAE | Medium | Skype, VoIP apps, gambling, dating apps | TRA blocks competing telecom services |
| 🇧🇾 Belarus | High | Protest sites, independent media, VPNs during elections | Significant post-2020 election crackdowns |
Why censorship blocks most VPNs
Censorship firewalls block VPNs by recognizing them: every VPN protocol has a distinctive handshake and port, so filters can drop it without touching normal traffic. OmnixVPN tunnels over QUIC on port 443, the same protocol and port as the web, which is much harder to block selectively.
- ✓No recognizable VPN handshake for inspection tools to match
- ✓Runs on QUIC over port 443: the same protocol and port as modern websites
- ✓Blocking it selectively would mean blocking much of the web
- ✓Falls back automatically if a network interferes with the first attempt